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Demystifying Federal Labor and
Employment Law Preemption
Stephen F. Befort*
I. Introduction
Federal preemption is an increasingly important area of expertise
for labor and employment lawyers. As the sheer volume of laws and
cases governing the workplace continues to multiply, so does the need
to accommodate the respective spheres of federal and state regulation.
For both employee and employer representatives, an understanding of
federal preemption law is crucial for navigating the current maze of
multiple claims and forums.
However, federal preemption also is a topic that strikes fear into
the hearts of even seasoned labor and employment attorneys. Predicting
the potential ouster of state law claims is no easy task. The federal
preemption landscape consists of a complex web of rules and precedent,
and courts often appear to decide cases on the basis of highly technical
distinctions. In short, many perceive the topic of federal preemption as
a great mystery to be avoided if at all possible. The frequency with
which preemption issues now arise, however, makes avoidance of the
topic impossible.
It is often said that getting to know one's fears is the most important
step in conquering them. The same is true of federal preemption. Once
labor and employment attorneys become familiar with three basic prin-
ciples of federal preemption law, the seemingly incomprehensible na-
ture of federal preemption can be demystified.
First, federal preemption is not a single body of law but rather
an umbrella term that encompasses a number of distinct bodies of
law. This principle flows from the fact that federal preemption is only
permissive in nature. The Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution authorizes, but does not compel, Congress to preempt
state law.' Preemption analysis, therefore, depends upon congres-
sional intent and varies with each federal law. Congressional intent
sometimes is stated explicitly, but often it is not. In the absence of
an expressed intention to preempt state law, courts will "sustain
[a] local regulation ... unless it conflicts with federal law or would
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. U.S. CoNsr. art. VI.
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frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the
totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field
to the exclusion of the States."2
For labor and employment law purposes, federal preemption most
significantly arises from seven federal statutes. These statutes, in turn,
give rise to five separate "strands" or bodies pf preemption law:
-"Garmon" preemption under the National Labor Relations Act;
,-"Machinists" preemption under the National Labor Relations Act;
-Section 301, Labor Management Relations Act preemption;
-ERISA preemption; and
-preemption under federal antidiscrimination statutes.
Second, each of these strands of federal preemption has it own test
for preemption. Some of these tests, such as that used with respect to
federal antidiscrimination statutes, are quite narrow. Other strands,
like that arising from ERISA, have a broad preemptive scope. A key
principle in federal preemption analysis, accordingly, is that state laws
and claims regulating the workplace must be tested against each of
these five standards for preemption.
Third, each preemption test is grounded in a theoretical foundation
that reflects the unique attributes of the federal law in question. In
other words, each of the five standards for federal labor and employment
law preemption is designed to further the particular objectives of the
federal statute or statutes from which that strand arises. Federal pre-
emption, when viewed in this light, serves the very practical role of
shielding federal law objectives from being frustrated by state law.
Thus, the key to demystifying the topic of federal preemption, is to
ascertain the unique test and theoretical foundation for each separate
strand of labor and employment law preemption. As illustrated below,
the application of federal preemption law becomes much more compre-
hensible once these basic principles are understood.
II. National Labor Relations Act Preemption
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)3 governs labor-
management relations in the private sector. The NLRA, itself, is silent
on the issue of preemption. Nonetheless, the courts have interpreted the
NLRA and congressional intent as giving rise to two separate strands of
preemption premised on different, but complementary, theories.
A. Garmon Preemption
The United States Supreme Court long has recognized that an actual
conflict between the NLRA and state law "leads to easy judicial exclu-
2. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
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sion of state action."4 In San Diego Building Trades Council Local 2620
v. Garmon,5 however, the Supreme Court announced a much more ex-
pansive test for preemption.
1. The Test
The Garmon Court stated that the NLRA also preempts states from
regulating conduct that is arguably either protected or prohibited by
the NLRA.' The "arguably protected or prohibited" test broadly ex-
cludes state laws and claims without regard to the substance of the
state regulation. Thus, the NLRA preempts state regulation even where
the substantive terms of a state law are wholly consistent with that of
the NLRA.7
2. The Theoretical Foundation
The broad sweep of the Garmon test protects the primary jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to decide labor issues.
The ultimate aim of the Garmon test is to produce a uniform federal
law governing labor relations under the auspices of a single regulatory
body.' As the Supreme Court has noted, Congress did not merely lay
down a substantive set of rules in enacting the NLRA, it also "went
on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a
specific and specially constituted tribunal." 9
3. The Application
The application of the Garmon test requires an understanding of
what the NLRA either protects or prohibits. Broadly speaking, the
NLRA protects three types of employee conduct: 1) the right to organize
or join a labor union; 2) the right to bargain collectively through a
representative of the employee's own choosing; and 3) the right to en-
gage in concerted activity such as strikes and picketing.1 ° The NLRA
also protects an employee's right to refrain from engaging in these
activities. 1 Thus, under the Garmon test, a state generally may not
4. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
5. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
6. Garmor 359 U.S. at 245.
7. See e.g., Wisconsin Dep't. of Indus. Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc.,
475 U.S. 282 (1986) (state law barring persons or firms found to have violated NLRA on
three or more occasions in the preceding five-year period from doing business with the
state preempted).
8. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 613 (1986)
("The Garmon rule is intended to preclude state interference with the National Labor
Relations Board's interpretation and active enforcement of the 'integrated scheme of
regulation' established by the NLRA").
9. Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
10. 29 U.S.C. §-157 (1994).
11. Id
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impinge upon these areas of protected conduct either by statutory regu-
lation or by permitting the assertion of state court jurisdiction. 12
The NLRA also prohibits various "unfair labor practices" commit-
ted by either employers or labor unions. With respect to employers, the
NLRA generally bans conduct that interferes with employees' rights
to organize, bargain collectively or engage in protected concerted activi-
ties. 13 The NLRA also bans certain union activities such as coercing
employees to join a union or engaging in unlawful concerted acts such
as a secondary boycott. 4 Thus, the Garmon test further preempts state
regulation of conduct that arguably falls within the NLRA's unfair
labor practice proscription.
15
While the "arguably protected or prohibited" standard establishes
a broad preemptive sweep, the Garmon Court recognized that federal
labor preemption should not extend to matters either deeply rooted in
local feeling or of mere peripheral concern to the federal scheme. The
Garmon Court explained that state jurisdiction should not be ousted
with respect to compelling state interests, such as the maintenance
of domestic peace, in the absence of clearly expressed congressional
direction.' 7 The "compelling local interests" exception has been recog-
nized primarily with respect to picketing, violence or other situations
involving some type of injury to the person.' 8 Even here, however, pre-
emption will result if state regulation significantly affects NLRA rights
or procedures. Accordingly, a state law aimed at a matter of local con-
cern may be preempted if it bans conduct permitted by the NLRA,'9 or
poses a risk of interference with the NLRB's jurisdiction.2"
12. See, eg, Local 24, Int'l Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) (state antitrust
law preempted to the extent that it prohibited collective negotiations concerning manda-
tory bargaining topic under NLRA); Youngdahl v. Rainfair Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (state
court preempted from enjoining peaceful picketing protected under the NLRA).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1994).
15. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
(1971) (state court breach of contract action against union for its role in securing the
discharge of an employee because of delinquent payment of union dues preempted because
such conduct is arguably prohibited by NLRA); Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (state court action
by employer seeking damages from union for picketing to pressure employer to establish
a union shop preempted because such conduct is arguably prohibited by NLRA).
16. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44.
17. Id. at 247.
18. See, ag., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)
(state action for intentional infliction of emotional distress brought against union for
alleged outrageous conduct not preempted); International Union v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634
(1958) (state regulation of mass picketing and threats of violence not preempted).
19. Youngdahl v. Rainfair Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (state court may enjoin violence
on a picket line, but is preempted from enjoining peaceful picketing which is protected
under the NLRA).
20. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180 (1978) (state court trespass action to enjoin picketing on private property may
be preempted where NLRB has potential jurisdiction to decide unfair labor practice issue
concerning whether the content of the picketing is arguably protected by the NLRA).
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The second exception recognized by the Garmon Court concerns mat-
ters that are peripheral to the NLRA scheme. State regulation of activ-
ity that does not go to the heart of the purposes served by the NLRA
is not preempted.2 1 Thus, the Supreme Court has upheld employment-
related state statutes that do not directly impact the collective bar-
gaining process.22
B. Machinists Preemption
1. The Test
The second area of NLRA preemption prohibits state interference
with conduct that Congress intended to be left unregulated. In Lodge
76, International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission,23 the Supreme Court held that a state may not
regulate conduct, even if it is neither protected nor prohibited by the
NLRA, that is within the zone of activity that Congress meant to be
left to the free play of economic forces.24
2. The Theoretical Foundation
The test for Machinists' preemption is essentially an articulation
of its theoretical foundation as well. This strand of federal labor pre-
emption preserves the "intentional balance" struck by Congress be-
tween the power of management and labor to further their respective
interests.25 This balance, in turn, ensures that the outcome of the
collective bargaining process will be determined by the parties them-
selves rather than by a state's notion of an ideal method of resolving
labor disputes.
3. The Application
The principal application of Machinists preemption has been with re-
spect to state regulation of economic weapons used by parties involved
in a labor dispute. If a particular pressure tactic is neither expressly pro-
tected nor prohibited by the NLRA, state regulation that restricts a par-
ty's use of that weapon will be preempted. Thus, courts have invoked Ma-
chinists preemption to strike down state regulation of work slowdowns,
21. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44.
22. See ag, Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987)(Maine statute
requiring a one-time severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing not
preempted because collective bargaining process not infringed); Baker v. General Motors
Corp., 478 U.S. 621 (1986) (Michigan statute restricting unemployment compensation
insurance not preempted because statute did not directly affect the collective bargaining
process).
23. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
24. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149-51.
25. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 614 (1986).
26. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149-50.
27. Machinists, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (state agency ban on employees' concerted re-
fusal to work overtime preempted).
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the hiring of permanent replacement workers2 8 and a party's refusal to
agree to bargaining demands.29
The Machinists doctrine, however, does not preempt all state stat-
utes relating to economic weapons. The Supreme Court has upheld vari-
ous state statutes that only indirectly impact the collective bargaining
process by imposing minimum state labor standards.3 ° The Court also
has ruled recently that local government action that impacts the bal-
ance of power between labor and management is lawful when the action
is taken by the governmental entity in its capacity as a proprietor as
opposed to that of a regulator.3
III. Section 301 Preemption
A. The Test
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act makes private
sector collective bargaining agreements enforceable in federal court. 2
The question posed by section 301 preemption analysis is whether the
availability of an arbitration remedy under a collective agreement oper-
ates to extinguish a unionized employee's ability to pursue various
state-created employment rights. Although section 301 itself is silent
on the issue of preemption, the Supreme Court has long recognized that
"the subject matter of § 301 'is peculiarly one that calls for uniform
[federal] law.' ,33
The standard for section 301 preemption was established by the
Supreme Court in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.' In
28. See Employers Ass'n, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 32 Fo3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994);
Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters, Local 120, 512 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1994). Both
decisions ruled that a Minnesota law prohibiting the hiring of permanent replacements
to fill positions vacated by lawful strikers was preempted.
29. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986) (city
council resolution basing eligibility for taxi company franchise renewal on end of strike
and adoption of labor agreement preempted).
30. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724(1985) (Massa-
chusetts statute requiring certain minimum mental health benefits in health insurance
plans, including those established by collective bargaining, not preempted); New York Tel.
Co. v. New York State Dep't. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (New York statute providing for
payment of unemployment benefits to strikers not preempted).
31. See Building & Construction Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 507 U.S. 218 (1993) (NLRA does not preempt
enforcement of a prehire agreement by a state agency acting as the owner of a construction
project).
32. Section 301 provides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship
of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994).
33. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962) (quoting Penn-
sylvania Ry. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919)).
34. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
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Lingle, an employee brought a state law tort claim alleging that she
had been discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation
claim. The Seventh Circuit had found that the retaliatory discharge
claim was preempted because the facts underlying that claim were the
same as those applicable to a grievance under the just cause provision
of the collective bargaining agreement. 35 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that section 301 preemption occurs only if the resolution of a
state law claim requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement.3" The Court explained that:
even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require
addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law
claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the
claim is "independent" of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption pur-
poses.37
Since the resolution of the retaliatory discharge claim in Lingle did not
necessitate a construction of the collective bargaining agreement, it
was not preempted.
B. The Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical foundation for section 301 preemption rests primar-
ily on considerations of process rather than substance. The broad scope
of section 301 preemption reflects the favored role of arbitration in our
"system of industrial self-government." 3' The Lingle test is designed
to preserve the effectiveness of arbitration by vesting authority in ar-
bitrators, and not the courts, to interpret labor contracts in the first
instance.39 This preference for arbitration further ensures that federal
rather than state law will govern the construction of labor contracts. °
On the other hand, the Lingle test is unconcerned with the substan-
tive nature of rights created by state law. The mere fact that a labor
contract may provide a remedy for conduct that also violates state law
does not, by itself, result in preemption.4 If it did, unionized workers
would possess significantly fewer state law rights than their non-
unionized counterparts. In order to avoid such a result, the Lingle test
limits section 301 preemption only to situations in which the determina-
35. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987).
36. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413.
37. Id at 409-10.
38. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960). See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The
Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining
System, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 571, 624-25 (1992) (discussing the favored status of arbitration
for resolving disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements).
39. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 411; Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219-20
(1985).
40. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409; Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 211.
41. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 412-13.
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tion of a state law claim will require a court to intrude upon the inter-
pretative domain reserved for the arbitration process.42
C. The Application
Although the Lingle test requires a case-by-case determination, cer-
tain types of claims generally are preempted because they require the
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. This is particularly
the case with respect to claims asserting contract-based rights. Claims
that typically are preempted by section 301 include the following:
a. Claims concerning benefits provided under the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement;
43
b. Contract claims alleging that the employer breached a promise
to an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement;
4 4
c. Tort claims alleging a failure of a union to fulfill duties under
a collective bargaining agreement to maintain a safe working
environment; 45 and
d. Claims alleging a breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.46
On the other hand, section 301 does not preempt state law claims
that do not necessitate a construction of the collective bargaining
agreement. This is particularly the case with respect to claims alleg-
ing intentional or tortious conduct on the part of an employer. The
following types of claims are typical of those not preempted under
section 301:
a. Discrimination claims based upon state antidiscrimination stat-
utes;
47
b. Public policy tort claims alleging retaliatory discharge for exer-
cising a statutory right;48
42. Id at 409-10.
43. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (tort claim for bad
faith handling of health insurance benefits preempted); Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
935 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1991) (state law claim challenging unrequested medical leave
preempted because claim required interpretation of collective bargaining agreement).
44. See, e.g., Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1990) (contract
claim alleging breach of promise to investigate harassment preempted); Dougherty v.
AT & T, 902 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1990) (contract claim alleging breach of promise of job
security preempted).
45. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990) (fraud and negli-
gence claims against union arising out of safety inspections authorized by collective
bargaining agreement preempted); IBEW v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987) (third party
beneficiary suit against union for tortious breach of contract in failing to provide a safe
workplace preempted).
46. See, e.g., Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1990); Newberry
v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988).
47. See, e.g., Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1990) (religious
discrimination claim not preempted); Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514 (9th
Cir. 1988) (disability discrimination claim not preempted).
48. See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (claim
of retaliatory discharge for filing workers' compensation claim not preempted).
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c. Whistleblower claims, in which an employee alleges retaliatory
discharge for reporting an employer's violation of state or federal
law;4
9
d. Contract claims alleging a breach of a promise made by an em-
ployer to an employee who was not then in a bargaining unit or
covered by a collective bargaining agreement; ° and
e. Most often, claims for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.5 1
IV. ERISA Preemption
A. The Test
Although commonly thought of as a law relating to pensions, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 2 also regulates
other types of employee benefit plans. ERISA establishes procedural
requirements with respect to the reporting, disclosure and fiduciary
responsibilities for both pension and welfare benefit plans. Unlike its
coverage of pension plans, however, ERISA does not regulate substan-
tively the content of welfare benefit plans. Instead, the principal impact
of ERISA on the employment law landscape is a broad preemptive exclu-
sion of state regulation.
ERISA expressly "supercedels] any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."5 3 An
"employee benefit plan" for the purposes of ERISA encompasses both
pension plans and what are known as "employee welfare benefit
plans."' ERISA defines an "employee welfare benefit plan" as
any plan, fund, or program ... established or maintained by an em-
ployer or by an employee organization ... for the purpose of providing
... medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vaca-
49. See, e.g., Brevik v. Kite Painting, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1987) (claim
alleging retaliatory discharge for filing complaint under the Minnesota Occupational
Safety and Health Act not preempted).
50. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (individual employ-
ment contracts made prior to entry into bargaining unit not preempted); Anderson v.
Ford Motor Co., 803 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1011 (1987) (breach
of contract and misrepresentation claims alleging that employer promised newly-hired
employees that they would not be bumped by other employees on preferential hiring list
not preempted).
51. See, e.g., Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 906 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1990) (state
law claims of outrageous conduct, wrongful discharge, prima facie tort and intentional
infliction of emotional distress not preempted). But see Douglas v. American Info. Techno-
logies Corp., 877 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1989) (intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim preempted because it was necessary to analyze the collective bargaining agreement
to determine whether employer's conduct was authorized by the agreement).
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1994).
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tion benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services.5
The Supreme Court has stated that a state law or claim relates to an
employee benefit plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such
a plan.
56
B. The Theoretical Foundation
Congress, in enacting ERISA, was concerned primarily with control-
ling the "mismanagement of funds accumulated to finance employee
benefits and the failure to pay employees benefits from accumulated
funds."57 ERISA's "relate to" preemption standard provides for a "delib-
erately expansive" scope of preemption that is intended to preserve the
uniformity and integrity of ERISA's comprehensive civil enforcement
scheme."8 A core objective of ERISA's broad scope of preemption is to re-
lieve employers from the burden that would be imposed by a patchwork
of state regulation.59 Thus, ERISA preemption occurs even if the state
regulation only indirectly affects an ERISA plan,6 ° and even if the state
law or claim is consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements.6'
C. The Application
Courts have applied the "relate to" standard so as to preempt a wide
variety of state laws and claims. The Supreme Court has held that ERISA
preempted a wrongful discharge tort action in which an employee
claimed that his employer fired him to avoid making contributions to a
pension fund. The Supreme Court also has ruled that ERISA preempted
state contract and tort claims that alleged improper processing of a dis-
ability benefit claim. 63 Lower courts have followed suit in numerous deci-
sions. For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
ERISA preempted state law claims alleging improper administration of
an ERISA plan' 4 as well as a contract claim alleging an oral promise to
provide benefits in excess of those stated in an ERISA plan. 5
Recent Supreme Court decisions appear to signal somewhat of a
retreat from this expansive scope of preemption. In New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
56. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
57. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989).
58. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46, 54-55 (1987).
59. Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1987).
60. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990).
61. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
62. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 140.
63. Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 57.
64. Consolidated Beef Indus., Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 960 (8th Cir.
1991).
65. Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1987). See also McLean
v. Carlson Cos., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1480 (D.Minn. 1991) (ERISA preempts claim under
Minnesota's whistleblower statute alleging discharge in retaliation for reporting sus-
pected ERISA violations).
Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment Law Preemption 439
Co.,66 the Court explained that ERISA's "relate to" language should
not be read as modifying the usual starting point for preemption analy-
sis-the "presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state
law."67 In determining whether this presumption has been overcome in
a particular case, the Court stated that it must go beyond the unhelpful
"relate to" text and "look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute
as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would
survive.""8 The Court has invoked this modified standard in two subse-
quent cases so as to sustain state laws of general application that impose
only slight burdens on the administration of ERISA plans.6 9
The reach of ERISA preemption is tempered further by three limita-
tions. First, the Supreme Court made clear in two decisions that ERISA
preemption depends upon the existence of a "plan" and not merely upon
the availability of benefits. In Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne,7"
the Supreme Court held that a one-time, lump-sum severance payment
required by a Maine statute in the event of a plant closing did not
constitute an employee benefit plan.71 The Court concluded that ERISA
preemption is triggered only with respect to "a plan [that] embodies
a set of administrative practices," but not a one-time payment.72 The
Supreme Court also concluded in Massachusetts v. Morash73 that an
employer's practice of paying discharged employees for unused vacation
time did not constitute an employee benefit plan.74 The Court explained
that while ERISA applies to vacation benefits that accumulate in a
separate fund, it does not cover vacation benefits payable in a manner
similar to wages from the general assets of the employer.7 5
66. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
67. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655.
68. Id at 656. Justices Scalia and Ginsberg would go even further in altering the
test for ERISA preemption. In a 1997 decision, they filed a concurring opinion in which
they urged the Court to acknowledge that its "first take" on the scope of ERISA preemp-
tion was wrong and to adopt, instead, a "field" preemption standard. California Div. of
Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., _ U.S. __ , 117
S. Ct. 832, 842 (1997) (Scalia, J. concurring). Under this approach, ERISA preemption
would extend to the field of laws and claims regulating employee benefit plans but not
more broadly to encompass additionally those laws and claims only indirectly related to
an employee benefit plan.
69. See De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Serv. Fund, __ U.S. __
117 S. Ct. 1747 (1997) (state tax on gross receipts of health care facilities not preempted);
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., - U.S. __ , 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997) (state regulation
of apprenticeship programs under state prevailing wage law not preempted).
70. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
71. See id. at 14-15.
72. Coyne, 482 U.S. at 11-12. Cf Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320
(2d Cir. 1985), affd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986) (ERISA preempted state law claims to recover
severance benefits due under an established severance pay plan).
73. 490 U.S. 107 (1989).
74. Morash, 490 U.S. at 117-18.
75. Id. at 114, 116. See also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 4-5, n.2 (1983) (ERISA applies to a multiemployer fund that accumulates
vacation benefits for union members who work for various employers).
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Second, ERISA does not preempt state antidiscrimination statutes
that are consistent with the provisions of federal antidiscrimination
laws.76 This exception follows from the combined effect of ERISA's dis-
claimer of any impairment of federal law77 and the fact that federal
antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VII expressly preserve noncon-
flicting state law.7 s Accordingly, the Supreme Court has ruled that
ERISA preempted the New York Human Rights Law's prohibition on
pregnancy discrimination in employee benefit plans only to the extent
that the state law banned practices permitted under federal law.7 9
Third, ERISA's preemptive reach also is qualified by the "savings
clause" which preserves state laws that "regulate insurance, banking
or securities."8 The savings clause is qualified, in turn, by what is
known as the "deemer clause." This latter provision limits the applica-
tion of the savings clause by providing that an employee benefit plan
governed by ERISA may not itself be deemed to be an insurer subject
to the savings clause exception.81
The Supreme Court has interpreted these two clauses as providing
for a different scope of preemption with respect to plans that purchase
insurance as opposed to self-insured plans. In Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Massachusetts,2 the Court was asked to decide whether
ERISA preempted a Massachusetts statute requiring that health care
plans provide certain minimum mental health care benefits. The Court
held that the statute was not preempted to the extent that it applied
to insurance contracts purchased for ERISA plans.8 3 The state law's
application to these purchased contracts concerned the regulation of
insurance permitted by the savings clause. On the other hand, the Court
explained that plans that are self-funded by employers are exempted
from the insurance exception by virtue of the deemer clause." Thus,
ERISA preempted the statute's application to these "non-insurance"
plans.
V. Preemption by Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes
A. The Test
Unlike the preemption strands discussed above, federal employment
antidiscrimination statutes have a very limited preemptive impact. Ti-
76. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1994).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994).
79. Shaw, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XA) (1994).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XB) (1994).
82. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
83. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 746.
84. See id. at 747.
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tle VII, 5 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 6 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 7 each expressly disclaims any
intent to occupy the field of employment discrimination law or to oust
state regulation in the absence of an actual conflict between federal
and state law. In the language of Title VII, the preemptive effect of
these statutes is limited to state law "which purports to require or
permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment
practice" under federal law."8 In other words, federal antidiscrimination
statutes do not preempt state law that is either consistent with or ex-
pands upon the rights conferred to employees by federal law.89
B. Theoretical Foundation
The Supreme Court has described Title VII's core purpose as "to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of... employees
over other employees."'9 0 The narrow scope of preemption under federal
antidiscrimination statutes "reflects the importance Congress attached
to state antidiscrimination laws in achieving . . . [this] goal of equal
employment opportunity."'" State antidiscrimination law, from this
perspective, is an allied force in the battle to eradicate workplace dis-
crimination. Indeed, even state law that goes beyond federal law in
terms of the scope of prohibited discrimination is not inconsistent with
the ultimate goal of equal opportunity.92 Federal antidiscrimination
law, accordingly, precludes only state regulation that would permit
conduct that federal law prohibits.
C. The Application
The Supreme Court in California Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion v. Guerra9 3 ruled that Title VII only preempts less protective state
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or
relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any
present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such
law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter.")
86. 29 U.S.C. § 633 ("Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of any
agency of any State performing like functions with regard to discriminatory employment
practices on account of age").
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to invalidate
or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or law of any State or
political subdivision of any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection
for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this chapter").
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.
89. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
90. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
91. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 282-83.
92. Id at 285.
93. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
442 13 THE LABOR LAWYER 429 (1998)
statutes that create a clear and actual conflict with federal law. 4 In
Guerra, the employer argued that a California statute requiring a mini-
mum of four months of unpaid pregnancy leave violated Title VII be-
cause the statute did not mandate that male employees receive similar
leaves for physical disabilities. The Court rejected this argument ex-
plaining that Title VII does not preclude states from providing greater
protection against discrimination than that provided by Title VII. 95 In
addition, the Court reasoned that the statute did not compel unequal
treatment since employers voluntarily could provide the same amount
of leave to physically disabled men.96
The ADEA differs from Title VII and the ADA in one significant
respect. The ADEA states "that upon commencement of an action under
this chapter such action shall supersede any State action." 9 This lan-
guage would appear to require state agencies to relinquish jurisdiction
upon the filing of any federal suit under ADEA.9' In contrast, parallel
federal and state actions are not prohibited by either Title VII or the
ADA.
The potential for parallel federal and state law claims necessarily
presents questions of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Supreme
Court has held that a claimant is precluded from bringing a Title VII
claim in federal court if a state court has reviewed and affirmed a state
agency's dismissal of a similar claim previously brought under state
law.99 The Court based its conclusion on the terms of 28 U.S.C. Section
1738 which requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect
to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in state
courts. 100 Since the state court's ruling on the state discrimination claim
was binding on state courts, the Supreme Court reasoned that it also
precluded relitigation under Title VII in federal court.'01
In contrast, the Court has held that an unreviewed but fully com-
pleted state administrative determination does not bar a subsequent
Title VII claim. 10 2 In that case, the state administrative body held a
hearing to adjudicate an employee's claim ofracial discrimination under
the state human rights statute. The employee, after losing before the
state agency, filed a Title VII claim in federal court rather than appeal-
ing the decision in state court. The Court held that the unreviewed
state agency decision did not bar readjudication of the same issue in
94. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 292.
95. Id. at 285.
96. See id at 290-91.
97. 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1994).
98. See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENr DISCRIMINATION LAW § 6.38 (1988).
99. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
100. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466-67.
101. Id. at 485.
102. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
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federal court. 10 3 Thus, only state court determinations, and not state
agency determinations, have a preclusive effect on subsequent federal
antidiscrimination actions.
VI. Conclusion
Much of the apparent mystery surrounding the federal labor and
employment law preemption topic stems from the fact that the field
actually consists of five separate subtopics. Each of these strands of
preemption has its own unique test grounded in the theory and purpose
of the statute or statutes that it was designed to serve. Once these
principles are understood, the admittedly complex field of federal labor
and employment law preemption becomes less mysterious and more
comprehensible.
103. Elliot, 478 U.S. at 795-96.

